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Left Behind in Old Age?
Sources of Support for China’s Rural 
Elderly in a Period of Growth, Migration, 
and Demographic Transition
John Giles
World Bank and the Institute for Labor
Over the last 25 years, average incomes have risen considerably as 
China’s economy has undergone unprecedented growth and dramatic 
reductions in poverty. Not all regions of the country have benefi ted uni-
formly (Benjamin et al. 2008; Ravallion and Chen 2007) as gaps have 
grown between coastal and interior regions and between urban and 
rural areas of the country (Kanbur and Zhang 1999, 2005). In addition 
to geographic poverty traps that lead to different patterns of income and 
consumption growth (Jalan and Ravallion 2002), there are also consid-
erable differences across demographic groups not only in income levels 
(Chaudhuri and Datt 2009), but also in the level of coverage by safety 
nets and in the risks of falling into poverty (Duclos, Araar, and Giles 
2010; Jalan and Ravallion 1999). In particular, the movement of young 
rural adults to urban and coastal areas for higher income earning oppor-
tunities raises the prospect that older residents remaining in rural areas 
are at greater risk of falling into poverty. In general, rural residents lack 
access to pension support when they are of retirement age, and must 
rely on either their own labor income or support from family members, 
even as they age into their 70s and beyond. In rural China, fi nancial sup-
port for the elderly remains the responsibility of adult children and is 
even codifi ed into laws governing the family (Marriage Law 2001). As 
the population of potential care providers continues to shrink as a result 
of both China’s demographic transition and the availability of attractive 
migrant employment opportunities for the young, many observers have 
expressed concerns for the well-being of the rural elderly (Benjamin, 
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Brandt, and Rozelle 2000; Jiang and Zhao 2009; Li, Lu, and Feldman 
2009; Yao 2006). 
In this chapter, I use the 2005 1 percent population sample to docu-
ment the sources of support for older rural residents, and then present 
updated evidence on the rates both at which the rural elderly coreside 
with adult children and live in proximity to them. I then provide 
descriptive evidence on the extent to which private net transfers from 
adult children respond to low income levels of their elderly parents. To 
do this, I fi rst introduce a framework for examining how net transfers 
respond to elderly income, and then make use of a unique data source 
with information on the age and residence location of all nonresident 
children of the household. These features of the data source allow us 
to reduce one form of bias common in many studies of intergenera-
tional transfers: we control for the size and quality of the transfer net-
work. Given specifi c concerns over abandonment by adult children, I 
examine whether transfer responsiveness varies when an elderly person 
has migrant children, and moreover, whether the variance of expected 
transfers differs between elderly with migrant children and those who 
only have children living nearby.
The descriptive evidence presented shows somewhat higher vari-
ance in the predicted transfers to the elderly who have migrant chil-
dren, which is consistent with concerns that the current and future 
elderly may face more uncertainty in their support. Given that migrants 
employed in nonagricultural work are frequently in the informal sec-
tor, their incomes often are much more risky, thus it is not surprising 
that this risk is refl ected in transfers to their parents. To decrease risk 
to private transfer income, China’s government is currently supporting 
new rural pension programs that are designed to reduce these perceived 
risks of elderly poverty and to complement existing motives for private 
transfers.
Apart from income support from the family, income from own 
labor remains the other important source of support for the rural elderly. 
Recent research on elderly labor supply provides evidence that Chi-
na’s rural elderly continue to work well beyond age 60 out of neces-
sity. Recent studies of the retirement decision in rural China suggest 
that China’s rural elderly “work until they drop” (Pang, de Brauw, and 
Rozelle 2004), and only stop working when physically incapacitated. 
Physical labor in agriculture can take a signifi cant toll on the bodies of 
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those still working after 60 years of age and raise the likelihood of seri-
ous injury. Pension support for the rural elderly can be expected to have 
a signifi cant impact on the importance of working into old age, and is 
likely to affect the labor supply decisions of the elderly. One benefi t of 
a rural pension is that it could make retirement a feasible choice, and 
thus improve standards of living of the rural elderly.
In this chapter, I document the labor supply patterns of the rural 
elderly and show that a considerable share of that population works 
well beyond age 70. I examine the effects of both adult child migration 
and increasing family wealth on labor supply decisions of the elderly. 
The potential benefi t that a pension may play in facilitating retirement 
is evident as I observe declining labor supply with increases in family 
wealth and other sources of income.
The following section of the chapter presents evidence on the 
sources of support among China’s rural elderly. It fi rst presents descrip-
tive statistics from the 2005 1 percent population sample on sources 
of support for China’s elderly, with particular attention to contrasts 
between elderly living in rural and urban areas, and then discusses 
implications of changes in living arrangements that underscore con-
cerns that the rural elderly are at increasing risk of falling into poverty. 
Finally, the section presents evidence on the responsiveness of transfers 
to the income levels of elderly households, with attention to changes in 
responsiveness over time. As the rural elderly often support themselves 
through work relatively late in life, the following section presents evi-
dence on the determinants of elderly labor supply. In particular, it high-
lights the relationships between income, health, and migrant status of 
children and labor supply of men and women in their 60s and 70s. A 
fi nal section summarizes important fi ndings.
SOURCES OF SUPPORT AMONG CHINA’S 
RURAL ELDERLY
Major differences exist in the primary sources of support for Chi-
na’s urban and rural elderly and between men and women from both 
groups of elderly. Table 6.1 presents fi ndings on elderly sources of sup-
port by location and gender for 2005. Several differences across groups 
136   Giles
among the elderly are notable. First, although pensions are the single 
most signifi cant source of support for the urban elderly, they remain a 
very minor source of support for the rural elderly, almost entirely con-
fi ned to former civil servants and soldiers, and former village cadres.1 
In contrast, labor income is a much more signifi cant source of support 
for the rural elderly than for the urban elderly, being the primary source 
of support for 37.9 percent of the rural elderly. Family support is an 
important primary support for both rural and urban elderly households, 
but its role for the rural elderly is substantially greater.
Support through antipoverty programs does not fi gure prominently, 
most likely because the rural dibao—a social aid program provid-
ing cash assistance to the rural poor—was not an important source of 
income support for rural or urban elderly households.2 This fi nding may 
stem from the fact that the rural dibao was still being phased in at the 
time of the survey, although policy has shifted in the intervening period 
with the approval of rural dibao as national policy in 2007 with a resul-
tant expansion in coverage.3 Also notable is the inability of the elderly 
to earn income from property. In contrast to member countries of the 
Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development historically 
or other developing countries today, the elderly in China have not grown 
old in an environment in which they could accumulate land wealth. 
Lack of land wealth limits the ability of the elderly to earn income from 
rents and may also limit the scope for encouraging intergenerational 
transfers from their children (who would be prospective heirs).
Table 6.1  Primary Source of Support for China’s Elderly, 2005 (%)
S ource of support
Urban Rural
Average Male Female Average Male Female
Labor income 13.0 18.4 7.9 37.9 48.5 27.5
Pensions 45.4 56.9 34.6 4.6 8.1 1.3
Dibao 2.4 1.8 2.9 1.3 1.8 0.9
Insurance and subsidy 0.3 0.3 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.0
Property income 0.5 0.5 0.5 0.2 0.2 0.1
Family support 37.0 20.7 52.3 54.1 39.3 68.5
Other 1.5 1.4 1.6 1.8 2.0 1.7
NOTE: Most signifi cant share of support reported.
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).
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Looking at sources of support by gender among the rural elderly, 
family support is more important for elderly women and labor income 
remains more important for men. As shown in Table 6.1, 68.5 percent 
of women over 60 report that fi nancial support from family members 
is their most important source of support, whereas only 27.5 percent 
report that labor income is most important. By contrast, 48.5 percent 
of elderly men report that labor income remains their most impor-
tant source of support; only 39.3 percent report support from family 
members. When distinguishing the importance of pension by gender, a 
signifi cantly higher share of rural men (8.1 percent) than women (1.3 
percent) report that pension income is their most signifi cant source of 
fi nancial support. The gap between men and women refl ects historical 
differences between genders in employment in local government and 
the military. 
Rural elderly in their 60s are more likely to support themselves 
through labor income, whereas those over 70 depend far more on 
support from family members. Table 6.2 shows results by age cohort 
among the rural elderly and emphasizes the differences in fi nancial sup-
port between younger and older elderly people. Younger elderly rely 
more on labor income, and a shift starts after age 70. Notably, however, 
nearly a quarter of the elderly between 70 and 75 report labor income 
as their main source of support. Apart from family support and labor 
income, no other source of support for the elderly varies signifi cantly 
by age group. Moreover, no other component plays a particularly sig-
nifi cant role.
Table 6.2  Source of Support for China’s Rural Elderly, by Age Group in 
2005 (share of income in percent)
Source of support
Age group (years)
60+ 60–64 65–69 70–74 75–79 80–84 85+
Labor income 37.9 64.3 45.1 24.4 12.0 4.3 1.7
Pensions 4.6 4.7 5.1 4.7 4.4 3.8 2.6
Dibao 1.3 0.8 1.2 1.5 1.9 2.0 2.1
Insurance and subsidy 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1
Property income 0.2 0.1 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.1 0.1
Family support 54.1 28.6 46.6 66.9 79.1 87.2 91.1
Other 1.8 1.2 1.7 2.2 2.3 2.4 2.3
SOURCE: National Bureau of Statistics (2006).
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Evidence on Family Support
Until the last few years, policy on pensions and safety nets has not 
focused signifi cantly on the rural elderly because the family was assumed 
to be an adequate source of support. Policymakers had assumed the 
continued viability of traditional, family-based arrangements for two 
reasons. First, family values remain strong in rural areas, and Confu-
cian fi lial piety continues to sustain family care for the elderly. Second, 
any formal public policy response to the needs of the rural elderly may 
undermine existing private arrangements. For example, state transfers 
to the elderly may crowd out existing transfers from younger family 
members. 
With regard to the reliance on traditional family values, both policy-
makers and other observers have in recent years questioned the view 
that family support for the rural elderly will be suffi cient. Fertility 
decline driven by China’s population policies may ultimately lead to 
a breakdown of the traditional support system, but conclusions from 
research spanning the literature on demography and economics dis-
agree on the likeliness of this outcome. Zimmer and Kwong (2003) 
show that more children increase the likelihood that the elderly will 
receive support, but current simulation results suggest that declines in 
fertility alone will not lead to a collapse of family-based support for 
the elderly. Other research has suggested that fi nancial transfers to par-
ents respond to low income and low health status in urban areas (Cai, 
Giles, and Meng 2006), but that in rural areas interhousehold transfers 
are not often observed because they take the form of labor input into 
family farming (Lee and Xiao 1998).4 The following sections provide 
empirical evidence on elderly living arrangements and responsiveness 
of fi nancial support to low incomes.
Recent Changes to Living Arrangements and the Well-Being of 
the Elderly
The share of rural elderly living with their children has declined 
rapidly, both in the long term and in recent years. Changes in living 
arrangements have been cited most frequently as a reason for concern 
for the well-being of the elderly. For example, Benjamin, Brandt, and 
Rozelle (2000) note that in rural northern China, over 85 percent of 
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the elderly lived in extended households in 1935, but this fi gure had 
dropped to just over 60 percent by 1995.5 The decline in coresidence 
with adult children is strikingly evident over the six rounds of the China 
Health and Nutrition Survey from 1991 to 2006. Figure 6.1 shows that 
in the survey, nearly 70 percent of elderly in rural areas lived with an 
adult child in 1991, but by 2006 this share had fallen to just over 40 
percent. As elderly parent age increases, the probability of coresidence 
with an adult child approaches 100 percent.6
At the same time, a decline in coresidence does not necessarily 
refl ect a drop in provision of care to the elderly. In-kind transfers, such 
as supply of labor on extended family plots, are diffi cult to pick up in 
surveys, yet such transfers often occur both within and across house-
holds. Changes in living arrangements refl ect the increasing wealth of 
families. With increasing resources, coresidence may be unnecessary 
in caring for the elderly. Within villages in rural areas, elders and adult 
children are typically in the same small group (a sub-village administra-
tive unit) and live in proximity to one another. Given increases in hous-
ing wealth in rural areas since the mid-1980s, the trend toward nuclear 
Figure 6.1  Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly
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families may signal a wealth effect independent of the traditional value 
of providing support and care to elderly parents. 
In addition, the share of rural elderly with an adult child living 
nearby was actually higher. A more important factor may be the prox-
imity of adult children, not whether they coreside. Figure 6.2 summa-
rizes the living arrangements by age cohort from the 2004 Research 
Center for Rural Economy (RCRE) supplemental survey and includes 
information on children living within the same village as their elders. 
Although coresidence with adult children was less than 60 percent dur-
ing the 2003 reference period among those 60–70 years of age, more 
than half the elderly living alone or with a spouse in this age range had 
at least one adult child living in the village.7 This fi nding suggests that 
even though coresidence was well below the levels of the 1930s, adult 
children were still potentially available to provide care. 
Evidence suggests that migration decisions of adult children are 
infl uenced by the well-being of elderly parents. Decline in coresidence 
refl ects a decline in support for the elderly only if associated with 
increased abandonment of the elderly. The rural elderly may have suf-
Figure 6.2  Living Arrangements of China’s Rural Elderly, by Age
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fi cient support if they are receiving transfers from local or migrant adult 
children. Giles and Mu (2007) explore this possibility by conducting 
separate analyses using two different data sources. They fi nd a signifi -
cantly lower probability that a son will work as a migrant when a parent 
is seriously ill. Although parental illness has a statistically signifi cant 
effect on migration, it does not completely drive the decision to return 
from migrant destinations. Depending on the data set and methodol-
ogy, the effect of illness varied from a 15 percent to 26 percent reduc-
tion in the probability that a son would be employed as a migrant, and 
this effect was reduced if other siblings remained behind in the village. 
Although this level of responsiveness to elderly illness is signifi cant, it 
is not absolute. Moreover, elderly who are relatively healthy may have 
a much lower standard of living if nonresident adult children who are 
migrants are less likely to make transfers to their parents than adult 
children who live nearby. In light of these fi ndings, the next section 
examines how private transfers respond to low income levels of the 
elderly, including whether transfer responsiveness differs with migrant 
status of children.
Do Private Transfers Respond to Income of the Elderly?
Two important reasons exist to examine the responsiveness of trans-
fers and transfer levels. First, as China rolls out its national rural pen-
sion program, concerns may arise about formal support for the elderly 
crowding out transfers from private sources. Second, while evidence 
from the risk-coping literature suggests that elderly households with 
migrant family members may be less likely to fall into poverty (Cai 
et al. 2012; Giles 2006), these fi ndings are average effects and do not 
explore how transfers vary with pretransfer household income, nor do 
they consider the distribution of transfers and the risks that the elderly 
may fall into poverty if transfers do not materialize.
Much early research on intrafamily transfers had used data from 
developed countries and focused on efforts to distinguish whether trans-
fers were motivated by altruistic or exchange motives.8 This distinction 
is important as it has implications for how transfers respond to exog-
enous income received by elderly households. If an altruistic motive 
dominates, then family members outside the household may respond 
to reduced levels of income by providing an offsetting transfer. This 
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raises the possibility that any increase in income, as might occur with 
a noncontributory pension payment, would lead to an offsetting reduc-
tion in transfers into the household. If the altruistic motive dominates, 
the transfer derivative (which picks up responsiveness of transfers to 
income) will have an unambiguously negative sign and the magnitude 
will equal one if increased income perfectly crowds out private trans-
fers. When exchange motives or other motives are more important, then 
we are unlikely to observe any crowding out with increased incomes, 
and the transfer derivative may not be signifi cantly different from zero. 
Policy research examining the motives for transfers in developing 
countries has emphasized the importance of allowing both altruistic and 
exchange motives to be present at different levels of income. Theory 
thus suggests a net transfer function for the elderly:
      
(6.1)    NiT  = ƒ(Ii) + X'iγ + εi ,
where NiT  are net transfers into the household, iI  is a measure of pre-
transfer income, and Xi is a vector of other exogenous variables which 
infl uence levels of transfers into and out of the household (and γ is the 
corresponding vector of coeffi cients on X i). Errors in measurement and 
unexplained sources of variation are then represented by ε i . What is 
important in this model is that we allow pretransfer income, iI , to have 
a nonlinear effect on net transfer responses. Estimating how net trans-
fers, NiT , vary with pretransfer income is our primary objective, but to 
do this we must appropriately control for other factors, iX , that affect 
transfers into the household. 
Our choice of data source to use for this analysis is driven by con-
cern that omitted variables related to the potential transfer network out-
side the household could bias estimates of how transfers respond to pre-
transfer income. This would occur, for example, if the size or quality of 
the transfer network was systematically related to pretransfer income. 
If number of children or their ability (measured through education) also 
refl ects unmeasured dimensions of the ability of household members, 
then this may well be the case. In addition, knowing whether a house-
hold has family members who have migrated, even if in the more dis-
tant past, is important for making comparisons across households with 
migrant children and those with family members living locally. 
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The most appropriate existing data source for the study of transfer 
behavior is the RCRE household survey complemented with a Supple-
mental Survey conducted in RCRE households in 2004.9 An important 
feature of the survey is that it enumerated characteristics of former 
household members, including their current location and educational 
attainment, and this allows us to control for both the size and quality of 
the transfer network. Thus, among the regressors infl uencing the size of 
transfers, we include the number of children, which captures the effect 
of the potential transfer network size, and average education of children 
living outside the household, which proxies for the quality of the trans-
fer network.10 
Arguing that  iIf  may be nonlinear due to a switch from altru-
istic to exchange motives for transfers at a particular threshold, Cox, 
Hansen, and Jimenez (2004) estimate transfer responsiveness using an 
approach that allows one to estimate this threshold empirically as well. 
Understanding where this threshold is relative to the poverty line or an 
eligibility line for minimum living standard support may be important 
for thinking about safety net design and could be quite useful. Yet, an 
empirical approach that forces  iIf  to be composed of two linear por-
tions below and above a threshold may also be too restrictive. Earlier 
work examining transfers to elderly living in urban China raises doubt 
about the viability of the threshold model approach. Cai, Giles, and 
Meng (2006) show that the threshold model introduced by Cox, Han-
sen, and Jimenez (2004) leads to a switch from altruistic motives at 
less than half the basic needs poverty line for urban China. While this 
shouldn’t disqualify the approach altogether, the threshold also failed to 
fi t the data very well. 
Another approach to allowing  iIf  to be nonlinear is to use a par-
tial linear model for empirical estimation, and then empirically calcu-
late transfer derivatives at different levels of iI . We use the partial linear 
model introduced by Yatchew (2003) and implemented for analysis of 
transfers in Cai, Giles, and Meng (2006). In this approach, observations 
in the sample are fi rst ranked by iI , and then differenced to obtain
(6.2)    ∆ NiT  = ∆ƒ(Ii) + ∆X'iγ + ∆εi  .
Since iI  is bounded as the sample size increases, 0)(  iIf , and Equa-
tion (6.2) reduces to 
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(6.3)    ∆ NiT  = ∆X'iγ + ∆εi  .
As long as iI  and other independent variables are not perfectly corre-
lated, OLS estimation of Equation (6.3) will yield consistent estimates 
of γ. In order to estimate the nonparametric relationship  iIf , we use 
the estimated coeffi cients, γ̂, to calculate
 
(6.4)    ui = 
N
iT  − X'iγ̂ = ƒ(Ii) + εi  .
Assuming that the εi  are independent across households and identi-
cally distributed, iu  converges to  iIf  for large sample sizes. We then 
use locally weighted regression (lowess) to estimate the nonparamet-
ric relationship between the response of transfers,  iIf , to pretransfer 
income, iI .11 We also calculate the income-varying transfer derivatives 
of  iIf  as the slope of  iIf  in the neighborhood of  100,100  ii II .In Figure 6.3, we show the estimated transfer response,  iIf , for 
different levels of pretransfer income, iI . It is likely that transfer respon-
siveness from migrants may change as time away from home villages 
increases.12 In order to highlight changes in transfer responsiveness 
over time, we split the sample into an early period (1995–1998) and a 
later period (2000–2003). In each fi gure, we also separately show how 
transfers respond to pretransfer income levels for elderly households 
that have migrant children and those that do not. In order to highlight 
how transfers respond to income at different points in the income distri-
bution, we draw vertical lines at multiples of an annual nutrition-based 
poverty line of 875 RMB yuan per capita, and then report the slopes 
calculated at these points in Table 6.3.
Evident in the top panel of Figure 6.3, elderly households found 
transfers more responsive to income at low levels in the earlier period 
if they had migrant children than if they did not. Indeed, the slope, 
or transfer derivative, was not indistinguishable from negative one 
for elderly households with pretransfer income below one half of a 
nutrition-based poverty line. This suggests that public transfers to the 
elderly with migrant children would crowd out private transfers at very 
low levels of income. By income levels near the poverty line, how-
ever, the transfer derivative was −0.5 for elderly households regardless 
of whether or not they had migrant children. Thus, even in the earlier 
period, one would not expect private transfers to be crowded out by 
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Figure 6.3  Net Transfers Received by Rural Elderly, by Migrant Status 
of Adult Children
NOTE: Vertical lines indicate multiples of a nutrition-based poverty line, which is equal 
to 875 RMB yuan per capita in year 2000 RMB.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010), estimated using data from RCRE Rural 
Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi prov-
inces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, 
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payments from a noncontributory pension in those elderly households 
already at or above the poverty line.
By the later period, we fi nd that private net transfers into households 
with elderly residents become less responsive to income for households 
with migrant children. This decline in transfer responsiveness holds for 
the signifi cant share of households with incomes ranging from half the 
nutrition-based poverty line (or 438 RMB/capita) to twice this value (or 
1750 RMB/capita), and indicates that any concern about a noncontribu-
tory pension crowding out private transfers is becoming less relevant 
over time. Indeed, the decline in responsiveness of transfers to low 
income raises the possibility that the elderly may be more exposed to 
the risk of poverty with increases in out-migration of adult children and 
increasing likelihood that migration of children is permanent.
Will Private Transfers Keep the Rural Elderly Out of Poverty?
When we examine the responsiveness of transfers to pretransfer 
income above, it is important to remember that the predicted transfer 
Table 6.3  Estimated Transfer Derivatives for Households with Elderly 
Residents









1996–98 2000–03 1996–98 2000–03 
One-quarter 
poverty line
119–319 −0.84 −0.67 −1.73 −0.63
One-half poverty line 338–538 −0.73 −0.57 −1.03 −0.35
Poverty line 775–975 −0.52 −0.46 −0.49 −0.25
Twice poverty line 1,650–
1,850
−0.28 −0.35 −0.40 −0.21
Four times poverty line 3,400–
3,600
−0.11 −0.24 −0.31 −0.20
NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is 
equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household 
Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi provinces and the 
matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Alloca-
tion, and Land Use Survey.
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levels in Figure 6.3 should be interpreted as expected values, and that 
actual transfers will be some distribution around these predicted values. 
In order to assess the risk that private transfers are not suffi cient to keep 
the elderly out of poverty, we use a bootstrap estimation procedure to 
estimate the distribution of transfers around the predicted values. In 
Figure 6.4, we reproduce the predicted transfers from Figure 6.3 with 
confi dence intervals added, and we also plot the threshold of combi-
nations of pretransfer income and private transfers suffi cient to keep 
elderly households above the nutrition-based poverty threshold. This 
threshold is represented in each of the four graphs of Figure 6.4 as the 
straight line running from the net transfer axis when pretransfer income 
is zero to the point on the pretransfer income axis where net transfers 
are −500 RMB/capita and the household pretransfer income is just suf-
fi cient to keep the household out of poverty. The top two panels show 
the range of net transfers for different levels of pretransfer income dur-
ing the 1995–1998 period for households without and with migrants, 
respectively. Comparing the top two fi gures, note that more of the lower 
bound of transfers lies below the poverty threshold for households that 
do not have migrant family members. Indeed, during the earlier period, 
elderly households with migrant family members appear very unlikely 
to have income per capita below the poverty line after private transfers 
are included in household income.
Evident in the fourth panel of Figure 6.4, households with migrant 
family members are actually at a greater risk of falling into poverty by 
the 2000–2003 period. The fact that transfers are less responsive to low 
incomes, as highlighted above, suggests that a noncontributory pension 
or other support mechanism is unlikely to crowd out private transfers. 
Figure 6.4 provides evidence that such a transfer may be useful for 
reducing the risk that elderly households will fall into poverty.
In Table 6.4, we summarize the range of transfers at fi ve multiples 
of the poverty line. Drawing values from Figure 6.4, evidence sum-
marized in this table suggests that elderly households with pretransfer 
income per capita less than one-half the nutrition-based poverty line are 
at particular risk of falling into poverty.
The analysis of transfers presented here suggests that a noncon-
tributory pension has the potential to play an important role in reduc-
ing the risk of elderly households falling into poverty. While the rural 
dibao is intended to assist poor households, it only comes into play 
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Figure 6.4  Confi dence Intervals for Net Transfers Received by the Rural 
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NOTE: Vertical lines indicate multiples of a nutrition-based poverty line, which is equal 
to 875 RMB yuan per capita in 2000 RMB. 
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010), estimated using data from RCRE Rural 
Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi prov-
inces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, 
Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.
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Table 6.4  Estimated Range of Transfers to Households with Elderly Residents, Results for Neighborhoods of 
Different Multiples of the Poverty Line
Mul tiple


















One-quarter poverty line 119–319 Upper bound 1,356 1,643 1,489 1,655
Mean 948 1,216 1,081 1,071
Lower bound 531 718 664 479
One-half poverty line 338–538 Upper bound 1,155 1,276 1,293 1,484
Mean 811 910 942 953
Lower bound 469 610 601 461
Poverty line 775–975 Upper bound 785 908 1,019 1,381
Mean 517 648 709 821
Lower bound 307 420 473 290
Two times poverty line 1,650–1,850 Upper bound 421 605 701 1192
Mean 212 369 433 615
Lower bound 87 120 216 55
Four times poverty line 3,400–3,600 Upper bound 125 216 259 862
Mean −48 −137 −7 274
Lower bound −185 −568 −249 −345
NOTE: All values are in 2000 RMB yuan per capita. The nutrition-based poverty line is equal to 875 RMB yuan per capita.
SOURCE: Giles, Wang, and Zhao (2010) estimates based on RCRE Rural Household Surveys for 1995–2003 from Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, 
and Shanxi provinces and the matched RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use 
Survey.
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after a household has been recognized as poor. Lowering the risk that 
an elderly household falls into poverty can have benefi cial effects on a 
range of economic decisions. In particular, by reducing the risk of fall-
ing into poverty, it is likely that the incentive for unproductive forms of 
precautionary saving are reduced and we are also likely to affect labor 
supply and retirement decisions of elderly households.
When considering the results from the four-province analysis of 
transfers, one should remember that although poorer areas of Anhui, 
Shanxi, and Henan are included in the analysis sample, these prov-
inces are generally considered middle income, and Jiangsu is included 
among upper-income coastal provinces. If transfer responsiveness to 
low income is also declining among households with migrant children 
in poorer regions of China, then a higher share of elderly households are 
likely to be at risk of slipping into poverty. 
THE LABOR SUPPLY AND “RETIREMENT” DECISIONS OF 
CHINA’S RURAL ELDERLY
Recent studies of retirement decisions in rural China suggest that 
rural elderly “work until they drop” and stop working only when physi-
cally incapacitated (Pang, de Brauw, and Rozelle 2004). Benjamin, 
Brandt, and Fan (2003) fi nd evidence suggesting that the likelihood 
of working in agriculture declines signifi cantly with increases in fam-
ily wealth, raising the possibility that public transfers might facilitate 
reduced labor supply of the rural elderly. In China’s urban areas, where 
many of the elderly rely on pension support, relatively few elderly con-
tinue to work in retirement. By contrast, our earlier discussion noted 
that nearly 50 percent of rural men and 28 percent of women over retire-
ment age state that income from work remains their primary source 
of support. Because a considerable number of elderly receiving family 
support also continue to work, these fi gures signifi cantly understate the 
degree to which China’s rural elderly continue to work after retirement 
age.
Even as family wealth and incomes have increased among house-
holds in rural China, some data sources suggest that China’s rural 
elderly were more likely to work. Evident in Figure 6.5, employment 
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Figure 6.5  Employment Status of the Rural Elderly over Time
SOURCE: Cai et al. (2012) using survey data from RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural 
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status increases across the age distribution from 1993 to 2003 for elderly 
relatives of RCRE panel households.13 Indeed, over this period of ris-
ing household incomes, employment rates of the rural elderly increased 
at every age. In fact, continued employment of the elderly may be an 
important contributing factor to the rising incomes of rural households. 
As rural household incomes increase with the migrant employment of 
younger adults, older parents remain behind and continue farming the 
household land. 
Features of China’s land tenure system may contribute to the effect 
of child migration on the labor supply of the elderly. Access to land 
in rural China has long been the safety net for able-bodied rural resi-
dents, but restrictions on the ability to transfer land may also infl uence 
the labor supply decisions of rural residents. The inability to rent land 
further reduces the income of an elderly person in retirement, and the 
possibility that village leaders will reallocate land that is not kept pro-
ductive may create additional incentives for older farmers to continue 
working household land. Changes in the Land Law enacted in 2002 and 
2003 may have facilitated land transfer and presumably may also have 
infl uenced the labor supply decisions of older rural residents. 
To examine the possibility that migration of children is systemati-
cally related to labor supply decisions of the elderly, Figure 6.6 shows 
the share of age cohorts employed by migrant status for men and 
women in 1998 and 2003. No systematic relationship between elderly 
retirement and migration status of children is immediately evident. At 
the same time, however, migration status of children and the labor sup-
ply decision of an elderly household resident are both systematically 
related to household composition, family wealth, earning ability of 
family members, and health status of the elderly person in question. 
In order to better characterize the relationship between migration and 
retirement and labor supply decisions of the elderly, it is important to 
explicitly model the labor supply decision of the elderly while control-
ling for these other factors.
As a framework for understanding the retirement and work-
intensity decisions of the elderly, assume that individuals (or house-
holds) maximize utility subject to a family budget constraint. The bud-
get constraint is a function of wealth, income, available time, health sta-
tus, and nonlabor income of household members. From the constrained 
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SOURCE: Cai et al. (2012) using survey data from RCRE 2004 Supplemental Rural 
Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use Survey.
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utility maximization decision, we conceptualize a general model of 
labor supply:
(6.5)    Lsit = ƒ(W hit , I wit , I itnw, Hit ,Tit ,Xit ,Vit , Djt) ,
where labor supply of individual i at time t, Lsit , is a function of household 
wealth, W hit
 , income from work of all household members, I wit , income 
unrelated to current work, I itnw
 , health status, Hit , an individual’s time 
endowment, Tit  , and a vector of individual and household characteris-
tics refl ecting preferences, Xit , which include own age and demographic 
characteristics of the household affecting preferences. We also consider 
the presence of unobserved village institutional characteristics affecting 
labor supply, Vit , and province-year dummy variables controlling for 
provincewide macroeconomic shocks, Djt . Identifying precise effects 
of each of these variables can be complicated by three factors that may 
introduce bias into our estimates: 1) some are imperfectly observed; 
2) there are functional relationships among some of these variables 
(e.g., health status may affect income through productivity, available 
time, and available household wealth); and 3) labor supply of an elderly 
individual may be simultaneously determined with the labor supply 
decisions of other family members. In order to avoid bias in our labor 
supply models, we use measures of education, age, and health, which 
are the longer-term determinants of income and wealth.
Because wealth (W hit ) and current labor income (I wit ) of a household 
are determined by the current and past productivity of household mem-
bers, we use information on educational attainment and age to charac-
terize productivity. Educational attainment of the elderly themselves is 
likely to be associated with lifetime earnings and accumulated wealth of 
the household. We use the average educational attainment of other adult 
household members to proxy for the value of household labor. Health 
status also affects productivity and ability to earn income through its 
impact on capacity for work. Elderly who are ill or suffer physical limi-
tations may be unable to provide much labor for farm activities. Thus, 
the complete set of proxies for W hit and I wit in the reduced form are the 
educational attainment, health status, age and age-squared of the elderly 
family member, the average educational attainment of other adults of 
the household, and numbers of adults in different age categories. 
Left Behind in Old Age?   157
The employment status and location of adult children may have 
an important impact on the retirement decision. Income earned by the 
household may be affected by whether a former resident works as a 
migrant in another location or in a nearby location. In particular, the 
effect of a migrant child is likely to be ambiguous. On one hand, a 
migrant adult child may raise household income through increased 
remittances more than the migrant lowers income through lack of work 
in agriculture. In this case, we would expect the existence of a migrant 
son or daughter to be negatively associated with elder parent labor sup-
ply. On the other hand, if loss of work capacity when a child migrates 
is not offset by remittances, migration of an adult child may make it 
more diffi cult for an elder parent to retire. Moreover, if residents of a 
village stand a chance to lose land if it is not kept productive, then land 
tenure insecurity may create an additional disincentive for retirement. A 
migrant child will be associated with continued employment of elderly 
parents if the unobserved risk of land expropriation represented in Vit 
is correlated with factors infl uencing migration decisions, such as local 
poverty rates and lack of off-farm opportunities. 
Because it includes good measures of elderly health status, we use 
the China Health and Nutrition Survey to estimate a reduced form labor 
supply equation:
(6.6)    Lsit = β1Mit + β2Eit
own + β3Eit
other + β4ADLit + β5Penit  + Xit' γ + Djt + uit ,
where Mit is a dummy variable indicating whether a household has a 
migrant adult child. If increased household income through remittances 
dominates the effects of lost income from home production and con-
cerns about the risk of lost claim to land, then we would expect the 
coeffi cient on Mit to be negative.14 We expect that higher values of edu-
cational attainment of elderly, Eit
own, and other family members, Eit
other, 
will be associated with higher wealth and higher potential income and 
should be negatively related to elderly labor supply. Pension income, 
Penit  , will be negatively related to labor supply as leisure is generally 
believed to be a normal good. Finally, we characterize the health of the 
elderly using z-scores calculated from the average responses to a set 
of activities of daily living questions, ADLit .15 We include a vector of 
individual characteristics, Xit , which include age and age-squared and 
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are associated with own productivity, and demographic characteristics 
of the household, which affect preferences.
In estimating different versions of this model, we fi nd that coef-
fi cients on each variable vary with gender, and depend on whether a 
retirement-age individual is among the young or old elderly. For this 
reason, we estimate models examining labor supply on subgroups of 
the population. These include younger men and women between 60 and 
70 years of age, and older elderly between 70 and 80 years of age. We 
also estimate two types of models: binary choice employment models 
in which the outcome variable is an indicator of whether the elderly 
household member has engaged in productive income-earning activity 
over the previous year, and tobit models estimating the number of hours 
that the individual worked over the year. We present results of key coef-
fi cients for employment models in Table 6.5 and impacts on hours in 
Table 6.6.
Not surprisingly, we fi nd that as potential household incomes 
increase, the likelihood that an older person is working decreases. This 
effect is evident in Table 6.5 from examining the effects of pension 
receipt and educational attainment on employment. For each 1,000 
RMB per capita received as pension income, the probability that a man 
works (whether in his 60s or 70s) falls by 8 percent and the probability 
that a woman works falls by 6 percent to 6.4 percent. Own educational 
attainment does not have a signifi cant effect on employment of men 
in their 60s, but each additional year of education is associated with 
a 1.6 percent reduction in the probability that a woman in her 60s is 
employed, and a 1.2–1.3 percent reduction in probability that elderly 
people in their 70s are working. An increase in the average years of 
education of other family members has an even stronger depressing 
effect on labor force participation: higher average levels of education 
are associated with higher permanent income of the family, and this 
facilitates retirement. 
Ill health, as represented by increases in the activities of daily living 
(ADL) z-score, also lowers the likelihood that an individual engages 
in productive activities. Since men are often tasked with more physi-
cally demanding jobs in agriculture, it is not surprising that this effect is 
stronger for men in both age categories than for women. A one standard 
deviation increase in the ADL z-score is associated with an 11 and 8 
percent decrease in probability of employment for men and women, 
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respectively, in their 60s, and a 10 and 5 percent decrease for men and 
women in their 70s. 
When we examine the effects of migration on elderly labor supply, 
we observe positive coeffi cients for all subgroups. This indicates that 
the effects of lost farm income and uncertainty about land tenure likely 
dominate the effects of increased income from remittances in labor 
supply decisions. Nonetheless, this effect is not statistically signifi cant 
for men or for women under 70. Women over 70, however, are 8 per-
cent more likely to continue working (most likely in agriculture) if the 
household has a migrant child. 
When we examine the number of hours worked in Table 6.6, we fi nd 
consistent results. Women over 70 with a migrant child work 411 hours 
more during a year, or the equivalent of 10 40-hour work weeks. For 
regions of the country planting two crops a year, this would amount to 
Table 6.5 Factors Affecting Labor Supply Decisions of the Elderly, 
Linear Model
Dependent variable: engaged in productive activities during the year
Vari able
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80
Men Women Men Women
Has migrant member 0.009 0.058 0.010  0.081***
 (0.041) (0.046) (0.046)  (0.032)
Years of education −0.005 −0.016*** −0.013*** −0.012**
 (0.004) (0.005) (0.004)  (0.006)
Years of education of other 
household members
−0.017*** −0.020*** −0.018*** −0.015***
(0.005) (0.005) (0.005)  (0.004)
ADL z-score −0.113*** −0.079*** −0.103*** −0.049**
 (0.029) (0.026) (0.022)  (0.020)
Income from pension/
1,000 RMB
−0.083*** −0.064*** −0.084*** −0.060***
(0.012) (0.012) (0.011)  (0.010)
R-squared 0.237 0.287 0.261  0.179
Observations 483 586 705 818
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous 
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province.
 All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of 
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, chil-
dren 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with 
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects.
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004).
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full-time work during the agricultural busy season. Signs of the effects 
of education are of the same direction as in the employment models of 
Table 6.5, but once employed education itself does not have a strong 
effect on number of hours worked. 
Number of hours of labor supplied is also very sensitive to health 
status and to receipt of pensions. An increase in one standard devia-
tion of the ADL index is associated with a 417-hour reduction in labor 
supplied by men in their 60s, and a reduction of 350 hours by men in 
their 70s. Women in their 60s reduce labor supply by 300 hours with 
a one standard deviation increase in their ADL index, while women in 
their 70s reduce hours by 211 hours in response to a similar worsening 
in their health. Pension receipt also has a stronger depressing effect on 
hours worked by men in their 60s. 
The urban elderly are much less likely to work after age 60 than 
rural elderly, and the results presented here suggest that any mechanism 
Table 6.6  Factors Affecting Hours Worked by the Elderly, Tobit Model
Dependent variable: hours worked
Varia ble
Ages 60–70 Ages 70–80
Men Women Men Women
Has migrant child 44.3 −7.6 199.1 411.2** 
 (168.6) (146.3) (162.1) (162.7) 
Years of education 15.2 −1.5 −27.0* −14.3 
 (18.3) (16.1) (15.1) (21.5)  
Education of other 
household members
−12.3 −53.1*** −40.4** −45.5***
(19.6) (16.6) (18.8)  (16.0)  
ADL z-score −416.9*** −299.9*** −294.4*** −211.6***
 (132.7) (94.8) (85.1)  (70.6)  
Income from 
pension/1,000 RMB
−447.9*** −314.1*** −350.4*** −308.0***
(71.1) (56.7) (52.9)  (49.0)  
Observations 479 586 705  816 
NOTE: *signifi cant at the 0.10 level; **signifi cant at the 0.05 level; ***signifi cant at 
the 0.01 level. Migrant family member = a member of the household from a previous 
round is no longer a household member and has moved outside the home province.
 All models include age, age-squared, household demographic variables (number of 
household members over 60, number of children younger than 3, children 3–7, chil-
dren 8–13, children 14–16, spouse present), and year dummy variables interacted with 
regions to control for provincewide macroeconomic effects.
SOURCE: China Health and Nutrition Survey (1991, 1993, 1997, 2000, 2004).
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providing the rural elderly with a fl ow of income in old age is likely to 
reduce both employment and hours worked. Were China’s government 
to develop a pension system for the rural elderly, it is likely that China’s 
rural residents may choose to retire rather than work until they are no 
longer able to do so.
CONCLUSION
Whereas the urban elderly receive signifi cant support from pen-
sions, the rural elderly rely primarily on their own labor income and 
fi nancial support from their children. More men over 60 rely primar-
ily on their own labor income for support, whereas elderly women are 
somewhat more dependent on transfers from family members. Evi-
dence presented on responsiveness of private transfers to income levels 
and on the determinants of elderly labor supply suggests that the intro-
duction of a pension system may lead to more security for the elderly 
without requiring them to continue working into old age. 
Private transfers are responsive to low levels of elderly income, but 
they do not perfectly crowd out income from other sources. At levels of 
income below the poverty line, transfers from adult children increase as 
elderly income decreases. When elderly incomes are at and even below 
the poverty line, however, private transfers are not perfectly crowded 
out by increases in income. A social welfare benefi t that raises incomes 
of the elderly will not crowd out private transfers. 
Migrant children continue to provide remittance support to their 
parents, but the predicted range of transfers suggests growing risk that 
low-income elderly may be left in poverty. On average, the predicted 
transfer from adult children is suffi cient to maintain elderly incomes 
above the poverty line. When the range of potential transfers is consid-
ered, however, elderly parents with migrant children clearly face more 
risk that private transfers will be insuffi cient to maintain standards of 
living above the poverty line.  
Elderly with higher incomes are less likely to work, as are elderly 
who are in poor health. Elderly with nonlabor income from pensions or 
in households with higher levels of education, and thus more income-
earning potential, are less likely to participate in income-earning activi-
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ties. If the elderly receive some type of social welfare support, they are 
more likely to exit the labor force when over 60. 
Elderly in poor health are less likely to work. Declines in health 
status associated with decreases in ability to perform daily tasks are 
associated with lower participation in work activity and fewer working 
hours for those who are still working. Improving the use of the health 
care system for preventive purposes may keep older workers productive 
and earning incomes for a longer period of their lives. Further research 
examining the effects of new rural health insurance programs (under the 
New Cooperative Medical System) is warranted to determine whether it 
facilitates improved health and work capacity of older workers.
Migration of adult children may have a signifi cant impact on the 
work status of elderly women. Having a migrant child in the family 
raises the probability that a woman over 70 will still be in the labor 
force and, conditional on working, will work more hours in a year. For 
men and women under 70, a migrant child has a positive but statisti-
cally insignifi cant effect on participation in income-earning activities.
Notes
The author acknowledges fi nancial support for writing this chapter from two grants 
provided by the Knowledge for Change Trust Fund at the World Bank (RF-P116739-
RESE-TF094568 and RF-P121130-RESE-TF098764).
 1. The data were collected before initiation of the national rural pension pilot pro-
gram in 2009.
 2. This fi nding is consistent with fi ndings in the World Bank’s China poverty assess-
ment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) using other National Bureau of Statistics data.
 3. See World Bank (forthcoming) for a detailed discussion of the evolution of rural 
dibao and other forms of rural social assistance, noting coverage expansion of 
rural I from just over 8 million in 2005 to almost 48 million in 2009.
 4. Using other methods, Cameron and Cobb-Clark (2008) fi nd no evidence that 
transfers to parents respond to low parent income in Indonesia. 
 5. Selden (1993) concludes that a transition to the nuclear family imposes a heavy 
price on the rural elderly. Living arrangements are thought to be important for 
elderly support across East Asia, including Cambodia (Zimmer and Kim 2002), 
Thailand (Knodel and Chayovan 1997), and Vietnam (Anh et al. 1997). 
 6. Two very different conclusions are consistent with evidence of greater incidence 
of coresidence with age: the oldest, who are more likely to be infi rm, tend to move 
in with adult children; alternatively, if coresidence has an effect on the quality of 
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care provided, then perhaps only the elderly living with adult children reach old 
age. 
 7. Coresidence in rural areas of the four RCRE provinces was also somewhat higher 
than observed for rural areas of the CHNS panel. 
 8. Barro (1974), Becker (1974), and Cox (1987) make important theoretical distinc-
tions highlighting different motives for transfers. Much of the empirical research 
in the United States has suggested that intergenerational intervivos transfers are 
driven by exchange motives (e.g., Cox and Rank 1992; McGarry 1999) rather 
than based on altruistic motives. It is important to remember, however, that in the 
United States, the Social Security safety net provides substantial insurance against 
poverty in old age, and thus it is not as surprising to fi nd an emphasis on the fl ow 
of resources from older to younger generations.
 9. We use the 1995 to 2003 waves of RCRE’s annual household survey from four 
provinces (Anhui, Henan, Jiangsu, and Shanxi) in which a supplemental survey 
(Supplemental Rural Household Social Network, Labor Allocation, and Land Use 
Survey) was carried out in collaboration with Michigan State University in 2004. 
A detailed description of the RCRE household survey and comparison to other 
household surveys conducted in China can be found in Benjamin, Brandt, and 
Giles (2005).
 10. Other regressors included among the X’s are age, years of schooling, marital sta-
tus, an indicator for whether the household has any members in schooling, the 
number of household residents, the number of working household residents, 
shares of household residents in different demographic categories, numbers of 
nonresident family members in different demographic categories, village dummy 
variables to control for the local economic environment, and province-year dum-
mies to control for macroeconomic shocks. 
 11. Specifi cally, we use a bandwidth of 0.25 with observations weighted using a tri-
cube weighting function as calculated by the lowess command in Stata. The low-
ess estimator was developed by Cleveland (1979) and has a benefi t over some 
kernel estimators in that it does not suffer from bias near the end points.
 12. The Poverty Assessment (Chaudhuri and Datt 2009) emphasized that 65 percent 
of rural migrants had lived in the current city where they were working for more 
than three years, and this duration was signifi cantly longer than reported in a simi-
lar survey conducted in 2001. 
 13. The information comes from a retrospective work history carried out as part of 
a supplemental survey conducted with RCRE in 2004. The supplemental survey 
asked about the work history of current and former household residents and their 
parents.
 14. It is also important to remember that we do not identify a causal relationship 
between migrant children and elderly labor supply. Unobservable factors related 
to the family (related to motivation, interest in income, or specifi c abilities) may 
affect both the migration decisions of adult children and labor supply decisions of 
their parents.
 15. Bound (1991) has argued that information from ADLs contributes less bias than 
self-reported health in models of retirement behavior. In the CHNS, individuals 
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over age 50 are asked to rate the diffi culty from 1 (no diffi culty) to 4 (cannot do at 
all) of the following activities: walking a kilometer; sitting continuously for two 
hours; standing up after sitting for a long time; climbing one staircase; lifting or 
raising a 5-kilogram bag; squatting down, kneeling down, or bending over; bath-
ing yourself; eating by yourself; putting on your clothes; using the toilet. We cal-
culate average responses to these questions for each individual, and then calculate 
z-scores over all elderly.
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